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John Perkins was the most senior black officer in the Royal Navy during the American War of 
Independence and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. He rose through the ranks from a 
carpenter's enslaved servant in 1759 to post captain in 1800, and went on to be one of the very first 
British officials to land in newly-independent Haiti in 1804. His career as a spy, gun-runner, naval 
officer and land owner was one of almost implausible adventure and speaks to the capacity of the 
maritime service to challenge and subvert race and slavery in the Caribbean. His very uniqueness, 
however, highlights the profound challenges for slaves and ex-slaves in trying to remake themselves 
as free people. 
 
 
A few months after the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution in May 1791 John Perkins, a Royal 
Navy lieutenant on half pay, was arrested by the French authorities in Saint Domingue and ‘confined 
in a dungeon … under the pretext of his having supplied the people of colour with arms.’ His arrest 
promoted a vigorous response from the Royal Navy, and two ships – the Diana and the Ferret – 
entered Jérémie harbour in south-west Saint Domingue to negotiate his release.1 Captain Thomas 
Russell of the Diana argued there was no evidence for the French accusations of collusion with the 
rebels. Instead he believed – somewhat implausibly – that Lieutenant Perkins was being held in 
revenge for his actions off Saint Domingue during the American War of Independence, which had 
ended nearly a decade earlier. Despite receiving formal requests from the governor and naval 
commander at Jamaica, the French refused to budge, informing the British that the ‘Law imperiously 
commands us to retain Mr Perkins’. Unofficially, Russell was told by the president of the Council of 
Commons at Jéremié that Perkins would be executed. After more than a week of fruitless diplomacy 
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and with time of the essence, Russell anchored off shore and dispatched the Ferret under Captain 
Nowell to intercede. With Perkins just hours from first the rack then the noose, Nowell demanded 
his immediate release on 24 February 1792, telling French officials that failure to do so would ‘draw 
down a destruction you are little aware of’.2 In the face of British aggression the French acquiesced 
and released Perkins who was taken back to the Ferret and then transferred to the Diana at sea.3  
This episode raises a number of questions: what exactly was Perkins doing there? Why did 
the navy intervene to recover him when he was not there on official service, and why were naval 
officers prepared to open fire on a French colony with which Britain was not – yet – at war? Perhaps 
more significantly Perkins, then a lieutenant later a captain, was not just another gallant naval officer 
of eighteenth-century British imaginations. He was Jamaican and the most senior black mariner in 
the Royal Navy. Through a series of almost-implausible escapades, he rose from slavery  to reach the 
rank of post-captain in the Royal Navy.  
There is growing interest in the role of both the enslaved and free people of colour in 
maritime service. The literature is particularly well developed in relation to antebellum North 
America where African Americans appear as skilled watermen, pilots, traders and mariners, many of 
whom enhanced their own prospects of liberty as well as helping to secure freedom for others. 4 In 
the Caribbean, it is also clear that maritime slaves were integral to the functioning of the island 
economies in a range of activities including inter-island trade, pilotage, salvage and fishing.5 The 
literature on black people in the Royal Navy also often emphasizes service afloat as a means by 
which the enslaved might serve under less brutal or exploitative conditions and could ultimately be 
freed. Olaudah Equiano and Robert Wedderburn – two of the most influential black figures of the 
abolition period – both used naval service in different ways as a means to escape their 
enslavement.6 Yet the relationship of slavery to the maritime world also created a new set of 
contradictions. The sea facilitated the movement of black people along the Atlantic litoral and 
presented enslaved pilots and coastal traders with a host of liberties almost unimaginable to 
plantation slaves, but enslaved mariners were not the legal equals of their white counterparts. 
Ashore, their freedom dissipated and – free or enslaved – they found their lives again governed by 
racial divisions.7 
John Perkins’ career brought him liberty, influence and wealth and, on the face of it, he 
seems to embody the capacity of maritime service to liberate. This article however, as well as 
reinscribing Perkins in the history of the black maritime Atlantic, suggests that Perkins experienced 
these contradictions in three ways as he navigated his route to freedom. Firstly, he shows that this 
transition from slavery to liberty was not a straightforward process and that even having secured his 
position, he remained acutely conscious of his uniqueness. Secondly, he was one of only a tiny 
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number of black officers in the Royal Navy and the only one promoted to captain. It is clear from the 
scholarship that Perkins was far from being the only highly-skilled black mariner in the Atlantic but 
no others reached his official rank. Naval and maritime service were not, therefore, 
straightforwardly a means of advance based on a meritocracy, and black mariners were confronted 
not so much with a glass ceiling but a wooden deck above which they were not expected to serve. 
Finally, his role allows an exploration of the complexity of the navy’s relationship with slavery: 
Perkins was an ex-slave whose job involved protecting the British system of slavery in the Caribbean. 
 
The navy in the Caribbean 
The Royal Navy loomed large in the eighteenth-century Caribbean. Countless petitions to the 
Crown and Parliament throughout the eighteenth century attest to the planters’ reliance on the 
navy for the defence of the islands and their trade routes. The Caribbean’s place as a key theatre of 
war in the eighteenth century made the navy’s military role essential. Even when eighteenth-century 
conflict went badly for Britain, as it did so catastrophically in the American War of Independence, its 
navy could be relied on to conjure up a Caribbean success at the Battle of the Saints in 1782.8 The 
relationship between the navy and Caribbean society is far less well understood, however.9 The 
Royal Navy’s principal roles in the region were to provide security for the slave colonies and to 
protect British merchant shipping carrying – among other things – slave-grown commodities as well 
as enslaved Africans themselves. In this sense, the navy was integral to the maintenance of Britain’s 
enslaved empire. 
The navy had two squadrons in the Caribbean – on the Jamaica and Leeward stations – 
where fleets were constantly maintained.10 As a result, the British navy remained a prominent 
feature of life in these islands in war and in peace. In 1782, in the face of real and imagined 
invasions, some 34% of all the navy’s ships of the line were stationed in the Caribbean, along with 
more than a quarter of its lighter cruisers and frigates. It also meant that more than 30,000 men 
were stationed there. This spike in numbers was unusual: the Jamaica station averaged 1652 naval 
personnel in peacetime between 1756 and 1813, rising to 4739 in the Seven Years War, 5519 in the 
American War and 7628 during the French wars. Even in peacetime, these figures suggest that naval 
personnel – the vast majority of whom were white –  represented more than 9% of the white 
population of the island. During the French wars, the navy added more than 40% to the local white 
population.11 The Leeward station fluctuated similarly in size, increasing from 1184 men in peace 
time to 6625 in the Seven Years War, up to a peak of 14,655 in the American War. It fell back to 6990 
during the French wars.12 The population of Antigua, the home station of the fleet, amounted to 
fewer than 2000 white people and almost 39,000 slaves in 1774.13  
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The navy faced a constant battle to maintain these manning levels. Disease and desertion 
significantly reduced the number of crew available.14 On the Leeward station in 1762, for example, 
Commodore James Douglas noted ‘the Seamen of his Majesty’s Squadron have lately so frequently 
deserted from the Ships on this Station that there is a Risque in sending them on Duty ashore.’15 As a 
result, many officers were notably reluctant to allow crew on land at all, let alone permit them to 
remain there for any length of time. As late as the early part of the Seven Years War, some (but not 
all) naval commanders continued to argue against using slaves or free blacks as crew in the navy  
because of their colour. But the increasing demands of naval manning and the recognition of the 
extent of black involvement in the maritime economy of the region ensured a supply of skilled 
mariners were employed by the navy, particularly in time of war.16 By the later eighteenth century, 
unlike the recruitment of black soldiers, the widespread use of black mariners in the Caribbean was 
largely uncontroversial.17 
Both Jamaica and Antigua maintained dockyards for supplying, refitting and even building 
ships. The work in these yards was usually undertaken by enslaved labour; indeed, the dockyards 
themselves were constructed by slaves.22 The restrictions on allowing crew ashore also limited some 
of the work that could be done by white crew. For Douglas, like other commanders, the solution was 
to order captains ‘to hire as many Negroes as may be necessary to unload the Ships arrived with 
Stores for His Majesty’s Service’.23 The navy recruited slaves in two main ways: either by hiring slaves 
locally on a per diem rate or in buying their own, ‘King’s Negroes’, sometimes locally, sometimes 
direct from Africa. The rationale was clear, as Admiral Charles Stewart at Port Royal put it in a letter 
to the Secretary of the Admiralty: ‘I am glad their Lordships are come to a resolution to buy Negroes 
… as the King has been the only person in this country not served by them.’24  
The navy’s relationship to slavery was therefore complex. It was a protector of slavery 
through its securing of trade routes and defence of the slave-based colonies and it actively recruited 
slave labour. Having done so, however, it tried to differentiate its treatment of the enslaved from 
that of the planters. In the 1720s and 1730s, Africans were sent to Navy Island just off the Jamaican 
town of Port Antonio to establish it as a naval base on the north coast. Those slaves were supplied 
with meat on a regular basis and were encouraged to form families: Admiral Stewart commanding at 
Jamaica, despite having no qualms about using enslaved labour, made a conscious effort to 
distinguish between slaves on naval property and plantation slaves. Later, in Antigua in 1800, John 
Duckworth included £50 for the ‘King’s Negroe artificers encouragement to industry’ in his accounts 
for the year.26 For some of the enslaved in its service the navy – and maritime service generally – 
might offer routes to freedom.27  
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By securing official authority and status, Perkins represented this transition to liberty; he 
also posed a significant challenge to the Jamaican slave society from which he came. Like Equiano, 
he was aware of his dual identity as a man born a slave who rose to be a plantation-owning naval 
officer, his ‘double consciousness’ becoming apparent at key moments in his life.28 Although Perkins 
has left few letters, his career can be pieced together from fragmentary evidence in a series of 
Admiralty records, from contemporary accounts of the events in which he participated, and 
nineteenth-century naval histories. His life allows us to consider the porosity of the boundaries 
between slavery and freedom in the Caribbean. 
 
Captain John Perkins 
John Perkins, once a carpenter’s servant during the Seven Years War, was made post-captain 
in the Royal Navy in September 1800. In one respect, his career reflects the capacity of naval 
patronage to recognise and reward the careers of young men who excelled, not the least of whom 
was his contemporary on the Jamaica station, Horatio Nelson. Unlike Nelson, however, Perkins was a 
black Jamaican.31  He was probably born in the parish of Clarendon in or before 1750, the son of an 
enslaved woman.33 As a child he was sent to Kingston and Port Royal where he became a ‘servant’ to 
a carpenter, William Young, who took him into naval service. On 22 June 1759, he joined the 
Grenado, a bomb vessel, as Young’s enslaved servant, along with another boy, John Middleton. Both 
remained with Young when he transferred to the larger Boreas on 7 March 1760. Perkins was not 
the only black boy aboard: the muster book records five other servants who joined at the same time. 
They were joined in June by two more: Thomas Bacchus and John Othello, both of whom were 
captain’s servants. On the Boreas, Perkins was present at two crucial moments in the Seven Years 
War: the capture of Martinique in 1762 and then at the siege and capture of Havana later that 
year.34 
Thus began a naval career spanning almost half a century, which took in service in the Seven 
Years War, the American War,  and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. After the Seven 
Years War, he left Young’s service and began work as a pilot.35 He had become sufficiently adept to 
secure employment in the navy aboard HMS Achilles. This part of his career began inauspiciously: on 
9 December 1771 he ran the Achilles ashore coming into Port Royal. He was blamed for the incident, 
it having been caused, as Admiral Rodney put it, ‘thro’ the unskilfullness of the pilot’. He was court 
martialled two weeks later. Found guilty, Perkins was thereafter ‘rendered incapable of servg. as 
Pilot in any of His Majtys Ships.’36 The verdict was enforced for a number of years and he returned to 
life as a civilian pilot, but as his knowledge of the seas around Jamaica increased, his expertise took 
precedence over the court’s ruling. He re-emerged in the Admiralty’s muster books as one of the 
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pilots in the Antelope, then Rear Admiral Gayton’s flagship on the Jamaica station in late November 
1775.37 In 1778, he secured his first command, on the private schooner Punch in 1778, and he 
continued as a civilian to provide information and intelligence to the navy, particularly in relation to 
French shipping off Saint Domingue.38 He entered the navy’s pay as a lieutenant in the sloop 
Endeavour in 1781 and it was in this role that he first came to the attention of the British public 
through a series of newspaper reports about his exploits. 
At the turn of 1782, the Endeavour sailed towards Port Royal with two prizes in tow when it 
was surrounded by French ships. Perkins escaped ‘by dint of good sailing’. In these reports, Perkins 
was represented as an accomplished British naval officer, not as a black mariner. The prisoners on 
his prizes reported a significant mustering of French and Spanish ships of the line, which 
corroborated other news leaking out from Saint Domingue, confirming British fears about an assault 
on Jamaica.39 When the French fleet sailed to meet the Spanish in April 1782 the Royal Navy was 
ready, and Admiral Rodney’s fleet intercepted and defeated them at the Saints. Despite his earlier 
misgivings, Rodney was so impressed that he promoted Perkins for his ‘behaviour in taking the 
French sloop with so many Officers on board her, and by your many services to His Majesty and the 
Publick’. The Endeavour was re-established as a sloop of war with 12 guns and was renowned for 
‘the superiority of her sailing to everything in these seas’. Rodney wrote to Perkins: ‘[I] hope you will 
have an opportunity of exerting yourself in the Service of your King & Country with as much 
applause now you are her Captain, as when you was only her Lieutenant and Commander’. Perkins’ 
previous misdemeanour was clearly long forgotten, and he was sent on a series of cruises off Saint 
Domingue to reconnoitre French forces there.40 Significantly, Perkins was brought into formal naval 
service on the basis of his experience and record. His particular expertise was more important to 
Rodney (who was much beloved by the Jamaican planter class) than his race or his enslaved past. 
At the end of the war, the Endeavour was decommissioned and sold off, and Perkins was 
placed on half-pay. He spent most of his time in Jamaica but travelled to Britain, first in 1784 and 
then in 1786. On neither occasion did he enjoy the experience: ‘I could not bear it’, he wrote, ‘I felt 
the cold to such afect [sic] that I was obliged to quit England in the month of October, and beleve 
[sic] it would have been the death of me had I not left’.41 By this time he had had nine children (at 
least six of whom survived) with three different women, one of whom was likely to be his wife.42 He 
remained available to the navy in a more or less unofficial capacity throughout the decade of peace 
between the American and French wars and very nearly succeeded in causing an international 
incident in February 1792.43 
 
The Saint Domingue revolt 
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There was great British concern about the slave rising in Saint Domingue not least in case 
‘the contagion’ of revolt should spread to Jamaica little more than 100 miles to the west. In 
November 1791, the Committee of West India Planters and Merchants in London had persuaded the 
government to increase its military presence in Jamaica because ‘attempts have been made and are 
still making to create and ferment in the minds of the Negroes in our Colonies a dangerous spirit of 
Innovation’.47 The British offered official support – short of military intervention – to the French 
authorities in Saint Domingue, but they remained anxious for detailed intelligence. To that end, they 
dispatched individuals there to send back information. Usually, they were white French planters, or 
Frenchmen who opposed the Revolution in France. In spring 1793, while Britain and France were still 
at peace, Venault de Charmilly, a planter and ‘a French Gentleman hostile to the present 
Government of that Country’, was to be sent to gather intelligence from Saint Domingue. Critically, 
the covert nature of his visit was emphasized: ‘too much care cannot be taken to secure the faithful 
conveyance of such intelligence, and at the same time to avoid the suspicion of it’s [sic] being 
transmitted.’50 
British officials in Jamaica, however, wanted intelligence offering more than one perspective 
on events in Saint Domingue. To secure it, they turned to the Royal Navy and to John Perkins. Even 
though the government’s public utterances declared support for the French planters and concerns 
about the slave revolt, a series of accusations were made that the British maintained connections to 
the insurgents as well as the planters. As early as September 1790, the Marquis de la Luzerne, the 
French ambassador in London, had warned that Britain had designs on Saint Domingue and had sent 
secret agents there.51 Perkins was more than just a spy, however. The French authorities had 
detained him ‘for his connexion with, and services to, the rebellious negroes’, including supplying 
them with arms and ammunition and ‘instigating them to rebellion, in order to effect their 
emancipation or liberty’.52 If true, Perkins adopted (or was placed in) a position diametrically 
opposed to the general view of the Jamaican elite and the official policy of the British government. 
But, as one later account put it, ‘the thing, indeed, is not impossible’ and, given the scale of the 
effort to get him back, it seems unlikely that he was there in a purely private capacity.  It is probable 
that there was some official sanction (at least in the region) for his presence in the midst of the 
Haitian tumult. 53 Moreover, the British did not send just any naval lieutenant on half pay to gather 
information in Saint Domingue; they sent their officer with the greatest knowledge of the seas in the 
area, a fluent French speaker and their only officer of colour, that is, the only one who could more 
easily assimilate with the insurgent groups rather than with the white population.  
Peter Chazotte, a merchant who escaped from Haiti to the United States in 1804, accused 
the British of waging ‘a disguised system of war’ against Saint Domingue through to February 1793. 
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It is true that he was a man who saw conspiracies around every corner: he argued, for example, that 
Galbaud as governor of Saint Domingue was ‘the principal agent of the British government’ and paid 
by them to foment revolution. He also – like Bryan Edwards – believed that British abolitionists, 
encouraged by Pitt, tried to instigate an end to slavery there. Yet his central argument that the 
British provided support to insurgents as well as the whites is not inconsistent with the accusations 
levelled against Perkins.54 And as later incidents would show, naval commanders did not always 
follow precisely the official line in relation to Saint Domingue.  
 
The French Revolutionary War 
Saved from the French gallows by the Royal Navy in 1792 and safely restored in Jamaica, the 
renewed likelihood of official Anglo-French hostilities presented an opportunity for Perkins, who was 
still on half pay. Two months before war with France was declared, Commodore Ford, commanding 
the Jamaica station, wrote to the Admiralty in March 1793 praising Perkins as ‘a most active, 
enterprising, useful officer, who might be employed here in a small vessel with great advantage to 
the State, provided … there arises an occasion for his Services’. A month later, and before he could 
possibly have had a response from London, Ford reported that he had given Perkins command of a 
newly-purchased schooner called the Spitfire, which was ‘a very fast sailer’. His specific role – much 
as in the Endeavour during the American war – was ‘to gain Intelligence of the Enemy’s Force and 
Movements at Port-au-Prince and Cape Francois [sic]’.55 Most of the rest of Perkins’ naval career was 
focused on Saint Domingue and the waters around it and he became the navy’s most experienced 
officer in those seas. Newly restored to his official naval role, Perkins quickly attracted press 
coverage for his exploits. In November 1793, for example The World in London reported his ship’s 
repeated escapes from the clutches of larger French vessels.56 
Perkins was then promoted to a larger ship, the captured French prize Marie Antoinette, as 
‘an officer of zeal, vigilance and activity’ as it was reported in the London press. None of his press 
coverage yet made any reference to the colour of his skin: he remained in the public mind an 
example of a brave, manly (and white) British naval officer. The Marie Antoinette was part of the 
squadron led by Ford that took Port-au-Prince in June 1794 before Perkins was again promoted to 
the 14-gun Drake in 1797 until it was taken out of commission in March 1799. 57 The Drake returned 
to Saint Domingue often, at first in support of the British invasion and then, in May 1798, to help the 
evacuation of what remained of the British forces. On 3 May 1798, 100 troops came aboard Perkins’ 
ship and on 8 May ‘at ½ past one got all the Troops Provisions and Ammunition off & all the 
Inhabitants that Choose to Evacuate La Archaye’ just along the coast from Port-au-Prince.58 He was 
promoted post-captain in September 1800 and appointed to the 24-gun Arab with 155 men. He 
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spent much of the first six months aboard cruising the waters of the Caribbean, primarily around the 
Leewards, harrying French shipping. 
In March 1801, the navy in the Caribbean received orders to detain all Scandinavian and 
Russian shipping. Within days Perkins attempted unsuccessfully to capture the Danish brig Lougen 
off  Saint Thomas. The Lougen inflicted damage on the Arab and, with support from the battery at 
Charlotte Amalie, the Arab was driven back. It was a defeat downplayed by Perkins but celebrated 
by the Danes.59 This setback aside, Perkins’ stock remained high, particularly after his role in the 
taking of Saint Eustatius and Saba in April 1801. Perkins’ role was widely reported in the London 
press.60 Just as in 1782 and 1793, his success was reported without reference to his ethnicity. 
Indeed, his origin as a ‘mulatto’ was revealed only in 1803 in a piece again praising his 
accomplishments.61 This success was likely to have been important in his next promotion, but he 
also had the backing of an increasingly important patron in London. By 1801, John Markham was MP 
for Portsmouth and a member of the board of Admiralty, but he had known Perkins probably since 
the early 1780s when they both commanded ships at Jamaica. His brother, Colonel David Markham, 
with whom Perkins was also acquainted, had been killed in Saint Domingue in 1795. Through these 
personal and professional connections, Perkins secured his command of the largest ship of his 
career: the 32-gun Tartar with 264 men aboard in 1802.62  
 
Authority and slavery 
Perkins’ initial elevation to the officer class in 1782, although not formally recognised by the 
Admiralty for another decade, and his meritocratic rise was hugely significant because it put him, as 
a black man, in a position of real power and responsibility that cut right against the grain of 
Caribbean life. In June and July 1782, one of his first tasks as lieutenant was to support the manning 
of the Jamaica squadron by the impressment of sailors.65 Impressment had long been a matter of 
great controversy. Not only had the American Declaration of Independence explicitly listed it among 
‘the long train of abuses and usurpations’ perpetrated by George III,  but it had also been the subject 
of significant periodical debate in Britain and America. Much of the language used to decry 
impressment in Britain described it as a violation of liberty and a ‘most absurd and cruel tyranny 
towards the most meritorious branch of the community’.66 In so doing, it aligned impressment with 
two distinct understandings of ‘slavery’ in Britain and its world: one was the result of arbitrary rule 
that breached the ‘unalienable’ rights of free men and the other, particularly in the Americas, meant 
the enslavement of Africans.67 The Royal Navy relied on the impressment of mariners and was thus 
open (at least in the eyes of polemicists) to accusations of slavery, which in the Caribbean implied 
something that happened to people of African descent. Just as impressment further complicated the 
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relationship of the navy to ideas of slavery, therefore, so too did Perkins – the black Jamaican – 
whose official position cast him in the role of the black enslaver of white sailors and free men. 
As the commander of his ship, Perkins was responsible for determining punishments for 
offences not serious enough for court martial. Under the Articles of War, naval captains could 
impose a punishment of up to 12 lashes, although this was often taken as meaning for each offence, 
and punishments of multiples of 12 were common. For more serious offences, courts martial were 
convened and dealt with matters of theft, desertion, mutiny, violence and refusal to follow orders. 
The courts martial had the power to impose capital punishment and corporal punishments up to 
1000 lashes.68 Naval punishments, therefore, for all the legimitacy vested in the courts martial at 
times looked little less brutal than those meted out to the enslaved. 
In just over a year in command of the Drake, Perkins sentenced 14 of the 86 sailors to 
punishments of between seven and 18 lashes.69 In the Arab he punished 11 men, including two 
masters, in eight months, mainly by whipping. One of the masters, James Tims, deserted along with 
five other men while the ship was at Martinique.70 This did not make Perkins the most violent 
captain in the squadron, and there are recorded instances of far greater brutality, but neither was he 
unwilling to use the lash.71 Like all captains, he had the authority to have sailors whipped for things 
he judged to be misdemeanours. But it is striking indeed that he was a black captain imposing 
punishments on white sailors, even in Port Royal harbour at the heart of Britain’s slave empire, 
where normally the implications for black-on-white violence were catastrophic. 
It was only on the Tartar after 1802 that Perkins’ use of punishments seems to have 
increased. In the year between June 1802 and 1803, he ordered the punishment of 46 crew and 
marines, including one midshipman, who was confined for insolence and neglect of duty. The Tartar 
had a much larger complement than the other vessels, so a greater number of punishments is not 
surprising. Perhaps more significant is the variation in offences being punished. On the smaller 
vessels the most common offence was drunkenness and, while the crew of the Tartar were not 
notably abstemious, more of them were punished for contempt, insolence and disobedience. There 
were also nine instances of neglect of duty, an offence which seems not to have occurred on Perkins’ 
other ships. 
 Precisely why Perkins found discipline harder to maintain on the Tartar is unclear. This 
period coincided with the peaceful interlude after the Treaty of Amiens in March 1802 and the 
relative inactivity (and lack of threat) could have resulted in a less-disciplined crew. For the first time, 
however, Perkins appears to have struggled against directly racialized disobedience. In May 1803, he 
wrote to his patron John Markham at the Admiralty to complain that his lieutenants were too young, 
and that the first lieutenant ‘is not more than 21 or 22 no sea man, & will never make an officer as 
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long as he lives’. This is likely to be the same officer – a ‘smart and proud Englishman’ – whom Peter 
Chazotte reported as saying it was ‘a cursed disgrace for us British officers to be placed under the 
command of a blood-thirsty colored captain’.72 This is a very rare – perhaps the only – directly 
racialized comment recorded from one of Perkins’ crew or officers and it is notable that it originated 
from the ship on which Perkins faced his greatest disciplinary challenges.  
 
Haiti, again. 
The resumption of war with Napoleonic France in 1803, soon after France’s reinstatement of 
slavery in Saint Domingue, created what the British – and its navy in particular – regarded as a series 
of opportunities. As in his previous commissions, Perkins spent a great deal of time cruising the 
waters off Hispaniola in the Tartar and took part in the blockade of Saint Domingue, which was 
partly an attempt to ensure that economic damage was inflicted on France, and partly to ensure that 
the revolution and the revolutionaries were confined and kept away from British islands. 
His most important role came in the aftermath of the declaration of Haiti as an independent 
republic on 1 January 1804. With Haitian independence, and despite their misgivings about the 
Haitian leader General Jean-Jacques Dessalines, whom they regarded as ‘that monster’, British 
merchants and officials in Jamaica were keen to reopen trade links to the new republic and, in 
particular, to establish Britain as its principal trading partner. British and Haitian leaders had long 
discussed commercial arrangements. Toussaint’s complex diplomacy in the 1790s had involved 
discussions with British officers and officials about trade treaties within a year of the British 
withdrawal from Saint Domingue, and Dessalines contacted Lieutenant-Governor Nugent in Jamaica 
about re-establishing commercial arrangements in June 1803 in advance of Haitian independence 
and while Saint Domingue remained (in name at least) a French colony.73 Edward Corbet was 
dispatched from Jamaica on 4 January 1804 (that is before news of Haitian independence reached 
Jamaica) as an envoy to negotiate a commercial treaty and to secure the long-term possession of the 
naval base at Saint Nicholas Mole in the north. He travelled there with Perkins on the Tartar, and 
carried a communiqué from Nugent to Dessalines.74 This was merely the first of a succession of 
missions to independent Haiti, but it also highlighted some of the tensions between the two 
territories, the new official spirit of diplomacy notwithstanding. 
Before reaching Port-au-Prince on 15 January, the Tartar called at Jérémie for two days from 
10 January. There Perkins became embroiled in a dispute with the commander of the Jérémie 
district, General Laurent Férou. Férou learned that three white merchants and a French officer who 
had served with the armées indigènes had secretly boarded the Tartar in Jérémie harbour and 
planned to sail with it to Jamaica. Férou demanded the return of the officer whom he regarded as a 
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traitor; Perkins refused. In making his preparations to sail, Perkins sent a party of sailors ashore for 
water at Aux Abricots, just to the west of Jérémie, and they were promptly arrested. In the stand-off 
that followed, Perkins faced a dilemma: was he willing to sanction the deaths of his crew to save the 
life of a French officer? He was not, and the officer was sent ashore and promptly shot while Perkins’ 
crew were released unharmed.75 Thereafter, the mission continued to Port-au-Prince, where largely 
cordial if fruitless negotiations continued. Neither the emollience of Nugent’s tone, nor Perkins’ 
record of harrying the French, were sufficient to remove Haitians’ mistrust of British intentions. 
After the failure of this first mission, Edward Corbet made two further attempts to conclude 
a trade treaty with Dessalines in February and March, and on both occasions he went to Haiti on the 
Tartar.76 During these visits, the Tartar took more than just the envoy, however. It also carried a 
significant cache of guns, which Perkins sold to the Haitians. When Corbet found this out on the 
second voyage, he wrote to Perkins in the strongest terms: ‘I cannot but consider the selling to, & 
supplying those People with Arms, which may ere long be turned against the Island of Jamaica or the 
British Commerce, to be impolitic & improper in the extreme, & as such I now make my Solemn 
Protest against it.’77 Corbet made his opposition known, in equally clear terms, to Nugent in Jamaica, 
who had been unaware of the transactions, which amounted to around 5000 weapons including 
‘musquets, carbines & swivels’. He seemed not to know that Perkins had already shipped 1800 
weapons on the first trip. 
These concerns were relayed to Perkins’ commander, Admiral Duckworth, and perhaps 
reflect some mistrust – at least on Corbet’s part – of the black naval officer who had been subject to 
previous French accusations of gun-running. Duckworth, however, vouched for Perkins. He wrote to 
Evan Nepean at the Admiralty to say ‘if I don’t comment on it, I consider the Transaction if not 
explained might operate against the Reputation of Captain Perkins with His Majesty’s Ministers.’ He 
went on to explain that these were prize weapons that had been seized during the French 
capitulation, which had been enabled by British naval blockade of Saint Domingue. It aided the rebel 
cause to such an extent that the British were allowed by Dessalines to occupy the naval bases at 
Saint Nicholas Mole and Tiburon. Although it is likely that the British were just as concerned to stop 
Haitians leaving Saint Domingue, the blockade also effectively prevented French forces under 
Rochambeau from gaining assistance from the sea. It meant they had no means of escape and they 
finally capitulated at Cap Français at the end of November 1803; the navy seized French ships and 
weapons as prizes.78 The ships were auctioned in Jamaica, but the weapons were sold back to 
Dessalines in Haiti. Duckworth claimed the guns would have been returned sooner had he not 
wished to keep British forces out of disputes in pre-independence Haiti. With independence and 
Corbet’s mission, ‘I thought it my Duty to direct Captain Perkins to carry up 1800 [guns] which 
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General Dessalines received with great courtesy, paying his own Price, and requested Captain 
Perkins to bring the remainder, which I directed him to do on his second visit.’ In other words, as far 
as Duckworth was concerned this was an entirely legitimate sale of French prize weapons to Haiti 
and he further justified it by saying ‘Captain Perkins being directed to promote the object he might 
point out as being beneficial to the negotiations.’79 
Be that as it may, it is clear that neither Corbet, the British envoy to Haiti, nor Lt-Governor 
Nugent, the senior official in Jamaica, knew anything about this possible negotiations sweetener. 
Dessalines’ response to Corbet’s first mission had been to ask for, among other things, weapons. 
Nugent had refused official shipments arguing – somewhat disingenuously – that ‘everything of that 
sort must be left to private merchants’, albeit with the governor’s permission.80 Before Haitian 
independence, the French complained that the rebels had been supplied by the British in the short 
period of peace after Amiens, and it seems certain that private merchants had sold weapons to 
them. Even though there seems to have been little official oversight of weapon sales, Duckworth 
clearly went further in acting  on his own initiative and only sought to justify the arms deal after its 
existence had been uncovered. His actions were not inconsistent with the navy’s previous position of 
maintaining relationships with both sides of the Haitian revolution, but they suggest, in this case at 
least, that British policy towards Haiti was far from coordinated or coherent. 
Perkins’ role also reflects a British awareness of the politics of race in Haiti. Corbet noted 
Dessalines’ apparent ‘deference to the opinion of his Officers of Colour’.81 It was surely not 
coincidental, therefore, that Duckworth chose his only black captain – a free ‘officer of colour’ – who 
also happened to have huge experience of Haiti, both in having patrolled the seas and in having set 
foot in the new nation. In this context, it is worth speculating, too, whether the French accusations 
against Perkins in 1792 may have had some foundation, or whether his appearance in Saint 
Domingue in the months after the slave rising in 1791 afforded him connections with the new 
Haitian elite. Chazotte certainly regarded Perkins as ‘an epauletted scoundrel’ who acted as a 
‘regular agent of the Wilberforce Society’, in particular through frequent meetings with General 
Férou in 1803 at which munitions and uniforms were supplied illicitly to the Haitians.82 Perkins, once 
a carpenter's servant now found himself at the heart of diplomacy between Britain and Haiti in the 
immediate aftermath of independence. He came into contact with Férou, later a signatory of the 
Haitian constitution, with Dessalines, and with the Jamaican governor, with whom he ‘had much 
business’.83 
The trade negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful after the British took fright when 
Dessalines ordered the slaughter of the remaining white French inhabitants of Haiti in March 1804. 
Some of the news about the massacres came from Perkins, who warned Duckworth of their 
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imminence when he returned to Port Royal at the beginning of March. Duckworth ordered Perkins 
to ‘call at the various Ports where the General [Dessalines] was likely to be, to use his Influence for 
the preservation of those poor unfortunate creatures’.84 Duckworth clearly felt that Perkins had 
developed a sufficiently useful relationship with Dessalines to have some influence. It was to no avail 
and Dessalines embarked on a genocidal assault on the white population.85 
Perkins was one of the first British officials to see the aftermath of the massacres and he 
described them in detail in letters to Admiral Duckworth. In March and April 1804, Perkins reported 
the rape and massacre of white people across the country: ‘such scenes of Cruelty & devastation 
have been committed it is impossible to imagine or my Pen to describe’. He believed that few of 450 
people in Jérémie had survived and that 800 whites were killed in Port-au-Prince in eight days. His 
version is largely consistent with that of Chazotte, who was one of the few survivors.86 The carnage 
was on such a scale that Chazotte, usually deeply critical of Perkins, wrote ‘even that cold-blooded 
agent of Wilberforce’ was ‘horror struck by the abominable deeds of brutish lust, carnage and 
pillage’.87 Perkins was ordered to help evacuate survivors, including some Spanish settlers close to 
the border between Haiti and Santo Domingo in Mancenille Bay on the north coast.88 
 
Perkins in Jamaica 
Some months later, just before Christmas 1804, Perkins was replaced as captain of the 
Tartar by Edward Hawker, although the Admiralty’s monthly ‘Disposition of ships’ records him as 
captain into 1805.89 There is no record of Perkins continuing to serve in the navy after 1805. The 
initial problem was that the Tartar was redeployed to Nova Scotia, and Perkins refused to go. He 
suffered from asthma, which had afflicted him throughout his career, and he had been told that 
‘going to a cold country in the dead of winter … would be the death of [him]’. He repeatedly wrote 
to Rear Admiral Markham to support his appointment to another command in the Caribbean, but it 
seems the Admiralty was unwilling to countenance officers with such specific demands.90 
By this time, Perkins was a well-known figure in Jamaica. His rank of captain had afforded 
him significant status, and his great experience of Caribbean waters and his exploits in two wars 
added professional respect.91 But perhaps as noteworthy is the fact that Perkins's status as an officer 
afforded him social status in official circles far beyond other free blacks or ex-slaves. Maria, Lady 
Nugent, wife of the Lieutenant-Governor and chronicler of social life during her time in Jamaica, 
included Perkins in her invitations to naval officers. Perkins, of course, had reason to see her 
husband, but some of his visits were social as well as professional.92 This may be even more 
remarkable than his naval career. It was one thing for him to rise through the naval ranks on the 
basis of his experience and expertise, but quite another for a black man – even as a free man of 
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colour – to enter the social world of the governor’s wife in early nineteenth-century Jamaica, where 
the particular whiteness of these social and naval functions has been emphasised by historians.93 It is 
unlikely that the planter class received him as warmly. Local perceptions of his active role in the 
Haitian revolution may have undermined his position  and it is possible that local white animosity 
may, in part, explain the Admiralty’s reluctance to appoint him to a ship in the Caribbean after 1805, 
his experience and expertise notwithstanding. 
Perkin’s complex relationship with slavery – and to his place in Caribbean society – went one 
step further. Not only was he a naval officer, he was also a land and slave owner and it was to this 
occupation that he most likely turned after 1805. He was reputed to have been involved in the 
capture of 315 prizes and 3000 prisoners over the course of his naval career, and it is probable that 
he used at least some of his prize money to acquire property in Jamaica.96 This was not an 
uncommon practice for naval officers: of the 41 commanding officers in the region in this period at 
least nine of them bought or inherited plantations, or acquired them through marriage. Officers of 
lower rank also bought estates or married into the planter class, the most notable being the young 
Horatio Nelson, who married Fanny Nesbit of Nevis.97 The Jamaica Almanacs for 1811 and 1812 
record Perkins as owning the Mount Dorothy estate in Saint Andrews parish, along with, 
respectively, 23 and 26 slaves. As a black plantation owner, he was not unique, but his status was 
predicated on his naval rank and career.98 After his death in 1812, his estates passed to his children. 




Perkins, of course, is not typical, but he and countless pilots and crew illuminate some of the 
complexities of the relationship between the navy and slavery in the Caribbean. Perkins was 
unquestionably a fine sailor who played a significant role in both the American and French wars. His 
status as an officer marked him as one of the elite, his race notwithstanding. His job required him to 
impress sailors and he thus was a descendant of slaves taking part in what many in the late 
eighteenth-century Atlantic regarded as a form of enslavement. As a black man ordering the 
punishment of white men in Port Royal, he turned the normal practice of Caribbean life on its head. 
His various roles in the Haitian revolution suggest that the British – from an early stage – saw value 
in either weakening a rival colony, or in maintaining relationships with both sides of the conflict as 
they planned for the post-revolution settlements. It is surely no coincidence that they turned to their 
only officer of colour in the Caribbean to be their main agent. Perkins himself seems to have been 
aware of his position, of his ‘double consciousness’ as a British naval officer moving among the 
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Caribbean elite and as a formerly enslaved ship’s carpenter who was never fully accepted by that 
elite. He might well have been sympathetic to the Haitian revolutionaries’ cause. This solidarity with 
black rebels sat uneasily with his official position, but even as he described the Haitian massacres 
which so horrified him in 1804, he was clear that only those immediately responsible should be 
blamed, rather than regarding the violence as being a characteristic of black people in general. He 
specifically noted attempts to save whites by ‘a vast number of Black Men who possess some 
feelings of humanity’.100 
Ultimately, perhaps, his uniqueness is most telling. There are no other instances of black 
officers reaching this rank, far less being invited to elite social gatherings. For all the countless pilots 
and crew on naval vessels, or the mariners in the merchant marine, only two other black men rose 
even to the rank of midshipman.101 As a result, it is clear that black mariners were systematically 
discriminated against. Maritime service unquestionably allowed the enslaved to ‘resist the 
routinization of slavery’ and played into patterns of slave resistance, but the fact that only one of the 
thousands of black mariners attained his rank reveals the limitations placed on black aspiration in 
the eighteenth-century Atlantic.102 
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